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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1953 TERM
Declaratory Judgments
"The general purpose of a declaratory judgment is to determine or stabilize an uncertain or disputed jural relation.
• . .)41
The declaratory judgment is a category of relief which
is in the realm of judicial discretion.
The determination of
the matrimonial status of parties is an approved ground for
declaratory relief.4 3 -Where
such relief is unnecessary, however,
44
it will not be granted.
In Garvin v. Garvin,45 which was decided by the Court of
Appeals in the past term, the plaintiff wife, having previously
obtained a decree of separation which necessarily entailed a finding of an existing marriage between the parties, was denied a
judgment which would once again declare the existence of that
marriage. Before final judgment in the separation proceeding
the defendant, in defiance of an injunction which forbade the
prosecution of divorce proceedings by him in any other jurisdiction,46 had obtained a divorce in the Virgin Islands. Subsequently he went through a marriage ceremony with another woman and
returned to live with her in New York. The court sustained the
defendant's challenge to the complaint on the ground that the action was. unnecessary in view of the previous declaration of the
marital status, although the defendant was now acting utterly in
disregard of that declaration.
Evidence-Estoppel
The Vehicle and Traffic Law provides that an automobile
dealer may allow the use of his dealer license plates by the vendee
of a vehicle for five days after the sale provided the vendee makes
a proper application for registration of the vehicle within twentyfour hours after he purchases. 4 7 If the vendee fails to make
proper and timely application the dealer may be held liable for
damage caused by the vehicle while being operated with his
plates. 48 This liability is based on the theory that the presence
of license plates on a vehicle is prima facie evidence of ownership by the registrant of those plates, 49 and that the registrant
41. 7 CARMODY-WAIT, NEW YORK PRAcTIcE 206 (1952).
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cannot rebut this presumption by a showing of his violation of
the registration statute.5 0
In Switzer v. Aldrich,51 the Court of Appeals was once again
confronted with a situation of this type. In a suit by the widow
of a person killed by the negligent operation of a truck, the dealer
who had sold the truck was made a defendant on the ground of
his owner~ship of the vehicle. The trial court admitted evidence
showing that the dealer was not the owner, but had sold the
truck to the person who was driving it at the time of the accident.
The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the action of the
trial judge, distinguishing Reese v. Reamore, 2 on the ground
that in that case the dealer had allowed the use of his license
plates over an extended period of time with the knowledge that
the operator had no intention of applying promptly for a license.
In the instant case there was an interval of only four days between the sale and the accident. The Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the Appellate Division and applied the doctrine
of the Reese case strictly, holding that any deliberate violation
of the statutory requirements is sufficient ground for an estoppel.
IV.

CONTRACTS

Parol Evidence Ride
In Perlman v. Israel & Sons Co.,' it appeared that an oral
contract of the sale was made and confirmatory letters were
exchanged which evidenced the contract. When the buyers sued
for breach of contract, defendants alleged a valid tender. The
Trial Judge excluded testimony of the defendant which offered
to show the conversation at the time the agreement was consummated, and charged the jury that plaintiffs were not bound to
accept goods allegedly tendered, so long as they were willing to
take and pay for them before the contract term expired. The
Court of Appeals, reversing a judgment for plaintiff held, that
the exclusion of evidence was erroneous and a tender, if made
and refused, resulted in a breach of contract excusing defendant
from further performance.
The parol evidence rule applies only where the parties to an
agreement reduce it to writing and intend that that writing shall
50. Shuba v. Greendonner, 271 N. Y. 189, 2 N. E. 2d 536 (1936).
51. Switzer v. Aldrich, 307 N. Y. 56, 120 N. E. 2d 159 (1954).
52. Supra note 48.
1. 306 N. Y. 254, 117 N. E. 2d 352 (1954).

